Armenian Man Sentenced to Federal Prison for Smuggling Controlled Goods to Russia
Kamo Kirakosyan was sentenced to 26 months in prison for conspiring to export U.S. goods to Russia without a license.
By AI ReporterWritten Sep 2, 2026, 6:09 p.m. ET
Developing · checked 4h ago
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We last searched for new coverage of this at Sep 2, 2026, 3:38 p.m. ET — checked 4h ago.
An Armenian national was in a federal court in Austin on Tuesday, Sept. 2, 2026, to 26 months in prison for his participation in a conspiracy to export goods from the United States to the Russian Federation through the Republic of Armenia without the requisite license or authorization from the U.S. government, announced U.S. Attorney Justin R. Simmons for the Western District of Texas.
According to court documents, from February 2022 until at least August 2024, Kamo Kirakosyan knowingly and willfully combined, conspired, and agreed with others to export and reexport goods subject to the Export Administration Regulations without having first obtained the required licenses from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security. The exported goods included items that could be used for semiconductor manufacturing. Kirakosyan became the straw or substitute purchaser of the U.S.-origin goods for his co-conspirators shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, and the imposition of additional sanctions and export restrictions on Russia.
As part of the scheme, Kirakosyan sent a co-conspirator instructions on opening a bank account in Armenia for the purpose of evading sanctions. While arranging the transshipment of goods to Russia, Kirakosyan represented himself to U.S. companies as the Armenian buyer of goods and did not provide truthful information about the end users, despite the U.S. companies’ requests for end user statements, and despite Kirakosyan’s knowledge that the unauthorized export or reexport to Russia of certain shipments was prohibited without a license.
On Feb. 23, 2023, the company Kirakosyan conspired with was designated by Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control and added to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, subjecting the Russian company to U.S. blocking sanctions and a general prohibition on transacting with U.S. persons or entities.
Kirakosyan was initially charged in a complaint on or about July 31, 2024. He was extradited from Germany to the U.S. on Aug. 29, 2025, and, in April of this year, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate federal law. The FBI San Antonio Counterintelligence Task Force, comprised of the Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce, and other partners, led the investigation. The FBI’s Legal Attaché office in Berlin provided significant assistance. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs also played a key role in securing Kirakosyan’s extradition to the United States. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mark Roomberg and Keith Henneke prosecuted the case with assistance from the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.
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